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Expanding State Court Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Car Manufacturers:
Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
In recent years the worldwide distribution network of major car
manufacturers has posed serious jurisdictional problems for federal and
state courts. With the advent of long-arm statutes, the problem has in
part been alleviated when the injury caused by a negligently
manufactured car occurrs within the jurisdiction where suit is brought. 1
Jurisdictional problems still exist, though, for the plaintiff who files a
complaint in a jurisdiction seeking to recover damages from a foreign
manufacturer for an injury which occurred outside the jurisdiction. In
dealing with such claims, courts have reached different results in
determining whether in personam jurisdiction over the manufacturer can
2
be established.
One approach, adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in Crose
v. Volkswagenwerk Aktienqesellschaft,3 is to find the auto manufacturer
present in the forum state under the traditional "doing business" statute, and thus amenable to suit. The critical issue in Crose was whether
the requirement that a corporation do business within a state is fulfilled
by the presence of a "well-organized, fully-integrated worldwide chain of
distribution" of that corporation's product within the state. If so the
defendant corporation would be subject to the jurisdiction of that court
on a claim for damages arising out of an injury which occurred wholly
outside the forum state, and service of process could be effected on an
independent dealer. In answering in the affirmative, the court not only
greatly expanded the bounds of its jurisdiction, but also raised serious
questions about the concepts of agency, corporate identity and the extraterritorial reach of state courts.
I Long-arm statutes generally provide for jurisdiction when the tort involved occurred
within the state. Typical is the Washington statute, which submits a person "to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any said
acts: ... (b) The commission of a tortious act within the state." WASH. REV. CODE §
4.28.185 (1) (1962).
2 Cf. Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg, Germany, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278
N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972). See also Lynch v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 322 F.
Supp. 1286 (D. Minn. 1970); Ritter v. Volkswagen Werk GMBH, 322 F. Supp. 569 (D.
Minn. 1970).
88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).

42

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

The plaintiffs in Crose, a husband and wife, brought a products
liability suit naming Volkswagen-Germany, Volkswagen-America, and
the Oregon regional distributor, Riviera Motors, as defendants. The
complaint stated that the plaintiff had been injured while a passenger in
an allegedly defective VW microbus. The accident occurred in California, and the vehicle belonged to a California resident. Service of process
was effected at the home office of each named defendant, and also in
Washington on C.T. Corporation System, a registered agent of Riviera
Motors. Pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, the distributor,
Riviera Motors, was dismissed on the grounds that it did not sell or
service the vehicle at issue. The remaining defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and also to quash the service of
process. These motions, as well as one for summary judgment, were
denied by the lower court, and certiorari was granted for this appeal.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's finding of jurisdiction, which had been based on the Washington statute
governing service of summons on a foreign corporation doing business
in the state. 4 That statute provides that valid service can be made on any
"agent, cashier, or secretary" of the foreign corporation. The court held
that the local dealer was sufficiently connected with the defendant to
meet one of those criteria. The court provided a mixture of policy and
factual reasons for its decision. As in many cases involving foreign corporations, the court was concerned that its citizens have ready access to
a convenient forum, and not be required to bring suit in a foreign district. 5 The court explained that it was entirely foreseeable that injuries
resulting from use of Volkswagenwerk products would occur in
Washington, therefore the corporation should have been on notice that
it might be sued in that state. 6 Finally, the court observed that the
distribution scheme of Volkswagen products created significant and
continuous economic benefits for the defendant and allowed it tight
control over the distributor (and indirectly over the dealer) within the
forum state, and thus it should not be a source of immunity for
7
Volkswagenwerk.
The court found that the requirement that the defendantmanufacturer be present in the state was satisfied by the presence of
C.T. Motors, an agent of a subsidiary. The court distinguished its hold-

4 "The summons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof, as follows:...
If the suit be against a foreign corporation or nonresident joint stock company,
partnership or association doing business within this state, to any agent, cashier or
secretary thereof." WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.080(10) (1962).
- See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d
893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
6 Crose, 88 Wash. 2d at __
, 558 P.2d at 768.
Id. at __
, 558 P.2d at 767.
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ing in Crose from that in State v. Northwest Magnesite Company by relying
on the "economic reality" of the distribution scheme rather than on an
assessment of the parent corporation's control over the subsidiary. 9 In
Northwest Magnesite, the court stated that, generally, service on a parent
corporation could not be accomplished by serving an agent of a subsidiary in which the parent corporation owned a controlling interest, 10
unless the parent corporation controlled the internal affairs of the subsidiary to such an extent as to preclude the existence of separate corporate identities. This is the rule first promulgated in the opinion written
by Justice Brandeis in Cannon ManufacturingCo. v. Cudahy Packing Co. 11
Cannon established that a corporation will not be deemed to be present in
a forum simply because it has a wholly-owned subsidiary there. The
parent corporation must also fully control the operations of the subsidiary.1 2 In Northwest Magnesite, the Washington Supreme Court followed Cannon, and concluded that, "whether the courts will disregard the
corporate form is ultimately a question of whether there is good faith and
honesty in the use of corporate privileges for legitimate ends." 13 In
Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co.,1 4 cited by the Northwest Magnesite
court, the court said that two corporations "are not to be adjudged as one,
in legal effect, unless their property rights and interests are so closely
commingled and related as to render it apparent that they are intended to
function as one, and to regard them as separate would aid in the consummation of a fraud or wrong upon others."' 5
Against this background, it is important to contrast how the Crose
court viewed the relationships between the parties. The court first established that Riviera Motors, the dismissed defendant, was present in the
state through the dealings of its authorized dealer C.T. Motors. The
court next said that VW-America was also present because of its extensive contractual control over Riviera. 16 The trial court had held that
VW-Germany and VW-America occupied the same position in relation
to the plaintiffs because the stock ownership and interlocking directorates connected the two corporations as one. Since this issue was held not
to have been properly raised on appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court did not consider it. 17 Thus the finding of jurisdiction over VW8 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947).
9 88 Wash. 2d at
10 28 Wash. 2d at

__,
___,

558 P.2d at 767.
182 P.2d at 664.

11267 U.S. 333 (1925).
12 Id. at 336.

13 28 Wash. 2d at-,
182 P.2d at 664.
14 174 Wash. 638, 26 P.2d 92 (1933).
Is Id. at 654, 26 P.2d at 98.
16 For example, there could be no change in the executives of Riviera or in its ownership without prior written consent by VW-America. Prior written approval of all dealerships and dealer agreements was also required, and Riviera used VW's uniform accounting and bookkeeping procedures. 88 Wash. 2d at __,

17 Id. at-,

558 P.2d at 766.

558 P.2d at 766.
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Germany followed directly from the finding of jurisdiction over VWAmerica.
By concentrating on the economic realities of the distribution
scheme, including the fact that each level of the corporate structure
realized a profit by the close integration of the parts, the court in effect
sidestepped the entire corporate separateness issue which might have
prevented a finding of jurisdiction. The court relied on the distribution
scheme in large part because of the decision rendered in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County.18 In that case, a tank
manufactured by Buckeye exploded in California, injuring the plaintiff.
Although the defendant manufacturer clearly had not sold the tank
within the state, the court upheld jurisdiction. Its rationale was that if a
manufacturer should know that its products will eventually be resold
within a certain state, it should be held to have, in effect, availed itself of
19
that state's market.
In upholding service of process on C.T. Motors, the court distinguished its holding in State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines v.
Superior Court for King County. 20 In that case, the court maintained that
the question of what type of agent could be served with process was
entirely separate from any consideration of what constituted doing
business within the state. Effective service of process instead depended
on the discretion or responsibility vested in the agent in his dealings as a
21
representative of the parent corporation.
The court also referred to Fiat Motor Co. v. Alabama Imported Cars
Inc.22 Fiat, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York City, imported Fiats which it then sold to its wholesale
distributor, Roosevelt Motors. A Fiat dealer brought suit against
Roosevelt and Fiat as co-defendants alleging that the defendants,
through their close relationship, denied the plaintiff's franchise the good
faith treatment required by the Dealer's Act. 23 Judge Warren Burger
affirmed the lower court's ruling that Fiat was subject to service in the
District of Columbia because it had extensive and continuing contractual
24
relations with Roosevelt Motors, which was located there.
There are several significant factual differences between Fiat Motors
and the Crose case, however. Roosevelt operated in the jurisdiction
where the suit was brought, whereas Riviera Motors did not. In Fiat
Motors, the cause of action was in essence founded on the very relation-

1871 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
19 Id. at 904, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
20 26 Wash. 2d 740, 175 P.2d 640 (1946).
21 Id. at 747, 175 P.2d at 649.
22 292 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
23 Id. at 747.
24 Id.
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ship of the two defendants. 25 Finally, the statute upon which jurisdiction was based was much broader than that which the Washington
courts cited in the Crose decision, 26 because effective service could be
made on "the person conducting" the foreign corporation's business,
without a showing of agency.
The difficulty of defining agency is only one of the longstanding problems courts have encountered in finding jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. The problem is avoided where a corporation has
designated a local process agent, 27 but where it has not, the courts in
this century have had difficulty deciding when a corporation should be
subject to suit in a state. Since the corporate entity functions without
regard to state boundaries, the problem has centered on formulating
standards to determine exactly when a corporation is considered within
a state and thereby subject to service of process. 28 Courts have traditionally attempted to strike a balance between the desire to provide local
residents with a convenient forum and the necessity of observing constitutional due process.
One rationale for establishing jurisdiction has been the "implied
consent" theory. According to this theory the corporation, by doing
business in the forum state under the protection of the state's laws, has,
in effect, consented to be sued on any cause of action arising in the state.
Since a state had the power to exclude a corporation, the fact that it did
not, coupled with the presence of the corporation's authorized agents,
gave the state jurisdiction over the corporation. 29 The inherent limitations in this doctrine, which required the presence of authorized agents
within the state, induced the courts to devise another approach.
To supplement the weakness of the "implied consent" theory, 30 the
courts next formulated the "presence" theory, which held that a corporation was deemed to be present in any state where it conducted business. The early cases suggested a quantitative appraoch in defining
presence, considering only the amount of business activity without expressly considering the hardship forced on the defendant or the actual
need for adjudication within that state. 31 In Rich v. Chicago, B & 0 Railway Co., 32 the Supreme Court of Washington, required for proper ser25 The Automobile Dealer's Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976) requires that
all dealings between auto manufacturers and dealers be conducted in good faith.
26 D.C. Code § 13-334(a) (1973) provides that "in an action against a foreign corporation doing business in the District, process may be served on the agent of the corporation
or person conducting its business. ... "
27 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 584 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as HORNSTEIN].

Id.
29 Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In PersonamJurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 578-79 (1958).
30 Id. at 582-84.
31Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 923 (1960).
32 34 Wash. 14, 74 P. 1008 (1904).
28
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vice of process that 1) a substantial part of the corporation's ordinary
business be within the state, 2) that the business be continuous rather
than casual or occasional and 3) that the business could give rise to a
33
cause of action by a resident plaintiff.
Subsequent decisions of the courts followed basically this same line
until the mid-1940's, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark
decision, established what is still the contemporary standard for obtaining in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. In International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 34 the Court upheld service on an out-of-state
corporation whose only local activity was the solicitation of business
through local salesmen who were paid on a commission basis. Significantly the Court recognized that the obligation being sued on arose from
the defendant corporation's local activity. 35 The theories of implied consent and presence were both found inadequate, and the Supreme Court
formulated a new doctrine:
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimal contacts with it such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
36
play and substantial justice.

The two basic criteria established by the court were that the activity of
the corporation be continuous and systematic and that the liability being
sued on arise from such activity. 37 Whereas the old theories were based
on quantum of presence, the new approach relied on a common sense
assessment of the circumstances of each case. 38 The Court's opinion
further warned that jurisdiction might also be justified in circumstances
where only one of the two enumerated conditions was present.
Subsequent to the decision in InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court
rendered two decisions which helped refine the holding in that case. In
the first, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 3 9 the Court upheld
jurisdiction of a California court over a Texas insurance company,
whose only contact with the state had been the sale of one insurance
policy. The Court attributed a clearly discernible trend toward expanding the acceptable reach of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations to
fundamental changes in the national economy. It noted that concurrent
improvements in travel and communications had made it less burdensome on a defendant to be sued in a state where he engaged in economic
activity.
33Id. at 17, 74 P. at 1008-09.
34326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3sHORNSTEIN, supra note 27, § 584.
36 326 U.S. at 316 (1945).
31Id. at 318.
38 Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 923.
39355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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40
The following year, writing for the majority in Hanson v. Denckla,
Chief Justice Warren noted the decision in McGee but was firm in stating
that it would be a mistake to assume that the trend toward expanding
state jurisdiction would eventually result in the demise of all restrictions
on the state courts' extension of personal jurisdiction over foreign individuals. Regardless of the ease with which a defendant could present
a defense in another state, the required prerequisite of minimal contacts would have to be met before in personam jurisdiction would
41
be extended.
Against this background, the Crose case presents two very significant issues. First, can a foreign corporation be deemed to be doing
business in a state by the presence of an independent dealer who
markets the manufacturer's products within the state? Second, is the
limited presence of the foreign manufacturer, which is established by
the presence of a dealership of the product involved, a sufficient
"minimum contact" to allow the state court to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising wholly outside the forum?
Two significant New York decisions are helpful in answering the
first question. In Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 42 the
plaintiff, a New York resident, filed suit in New York to recover for a
personal injury resulting from his fall in a bathtub in a London hotel.
The court reasoned that Hilton (U.K.), the corporation operating the
hotel in question, was present in New York because of the activities
conducted there on its behalf by its agent, the Hilton Reservation
Service. The Service performed all of the business that Hilton (U.K.)
43
would have done if its own officials had been present in New York.
The court recognized that litigation in a foreign forum might be burdensome or inconvenient for a defendant company, but casually dismissed this possibility as the price to be demanded of those who
engage in international trade. In elaborating on this idea, the court
stressed that when the foreign activities of a corporation are as
energetic as those of Hilton (U.K.), the corporation receives
considerable benefits from such foreign business, and therefore may not
complain about the burden.
A similar question of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based
on the presence of a representative of the corporation within the forum
state arose again less than six months after Frummer in Gelfand v. Tanner
Motors Tours Ltd. 4 4 Plaintiffs, New York residents, brought suit in New
York against the defendant tour company for an accident which occurred in Arizona. The defendant corporation had contracted with a

40 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
41

Id. at 251.
42 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
43 Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 853-54, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
44 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967).
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New York firm for the latter to promote the sale of tickets for the tour on
which the plaintiffs were injured. Relying on the language in Frummer
that "the Service does all the business which the defendant corporation
would do were it here by its own officials," the court upheld jurisdiction
even though the plaintiffs had not bought their tickets from the agent.
The court held that the foreign corporation was doing business in New
York in the traditional sense because its New York representative provided services beyond mere solicitation, and these services were essential to the operation of the foreign corporation. 45 To support its holding,
the court discussed the large percentage of business which was generated for the defendant corporation by the presence of the representative
in New York. Importantly, the court concluded by saying that it had
decided only the question of whether New York was a permissible
46
forum, not whether it was the appropriate one.
In order to answer the second question concerning sufficiency of
contacts to maintain in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
for a claim arising wholly outside the forum, the recent Supreme Court
decision in Shaffer v. Heitner47 must be analyzed. In Shaffer, the Court
extended the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe to in rem and
quasi in rem actions and ruled that the mere presence of property
owned by the defendant within the forum was not conclusive on the
question of jurisdiction, if the property was unrelated to the cause of
action. This is a significant caveat to the traditional rule of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 48 which established that jurisdiction could only be based on the
presence of the individual or his property within the forum. If there is a
requirement thaf the property present within the jurisdiction be related
to the cause of action, it could be argued by analogy that the presence of
the person, or the corporation, within the forum must also be related to
the cause of action. Thus, one can question whether the type of very
limited presence proven by a representative's conducting business in
the forum is sufficient.
In Crose, the car in which the plaintiff was injured was purchased
and delivered outside the forum, and the accident occurred outside the
forum. Even accepting, arguendo, that VW-Germany is present in the
state because of the presence of dealerships of its product, should this
type of limited presence, unrelated to the cause of action, be sufficient to
establish in personam jurisdiction? The court expressly adopted the
reasoning of Buckeye Boiler to support its determination that the distribution scheme was sufficient underpinning for a finding of jurisdiction. It
is important to note, however, that the cause of action in Buckeye Boiler

45 Id. at 121.
46 Id.

47 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
48 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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arose from an injury within the forum, and jurisdiction was obtained
49
under a long-arm statute.
In addition to due process considerations there are also serious
policy questions in upholding jurisdiction over VW-Germany. For instance, in holding foreign corporations amenable to suit in distant
forums because of the presence of a representative, state and federal
courts should realize that extensions of jurisdiction in this area may in
turn be used against U.S. corporations operating overseas. If diversified
corporations operating in the international setting will not be allowed
to segregate their assets and apportion their liability, the attractiveness
of investing capital or of conducting overseas operations is greatly

reduced. 50
Aside from the potential effect of the Crose decision on international
business, it is equally important to realize the two major problems it
presents for the local forum. First is the problem of forum shopping as
discussed by Judge Breitel in his dissent in Frummer. Under the rationale
of Frummer and Crose, it becomes more likely that nonresidents will be
able to file tort actions in the state of their choice, provided the corporation has a representative there, regardless of where the cause of action
arises. Second, Buckeye Boiler held that California should have jurisdiction because the preponderance of the evidence and witnesses were
located there. In Crose, neither the car, the driver, nor the site of the
accident were in Washington, the site of the trial. Beyond any consideration of convenience to either party should be a consideration of the
efficacy of conducting a trial when all of the evidence involved in the
accident and the key witnesses are located outside the forum state. This
is a significant factor in any trial, but one the court apparently ignored.
The Washington Supreme Court justified its upholding of jurisdiction over the foreign defendant by emphasizing the importance of
providing resident plaintiffs with an accessible forum. However, the
substantial lack of evidence within the jurisdiction, as well as the due
process questions raised by Shaffer, make it questionable whether the
Washington court will be followed in the future. The simple desire of
providing an accessible forum cannot override the important due process issues involved. The holding in Crose, then, may represent an untenable expansion of state court power.
-
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49 71 Cal. 2d at 896, 458 P.2d at 60, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
50 19 N.Y.2d at 546, 227 N.E.2d at 859, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
51 71 Cal. 2d at 906, 458 P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123.

